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May a Corporation Act as Its Own Attorney?
Timothy G. Cotner*
T HE QUESTION INVOLVED here is the right of a "person," not
an attorney, to bring action or defend in a court of law.'
If a natural person may represent himself, why cannot a cor-
poration choose to represent itself in court without the aid of
an attorney? The question is posed with the thought in mind
that in the eyes of the law a corporation is a legal entity 2 and,
therefore, should be permitted to appear in state and federal
courts solely through the representation of an agent. This kind
of a court appearance, whether by a natural person or by a cor-
poration, is referred to as an appearance in propria persona.3
Common Law and Majority View
A recent Illinois decision, Remole Soil Service, Inc. v.
Benson,4 has reiterated the view that corporations cannot ap-
pear in court in propria persona," nor may a layman in charge
of a corporation take assignments of the corporation's claims and
appear pro se, in actions brought thereon without complying
with requirements for admission to the bar.7 The traditional
rationale for the view that only an attorney may represent a
corporation in court is that a corporation is an artificial person
created by law and, being such, cannot act as a natural person
in presenting its own case.8 It must be admitted that a corpora-
tion cannot appear by any means other than by an agent and
thus it is impossible for a corporation to appear personally in
* B.S., John Carroll University; Third-year student at Cleveland-Marshall
Law School of Baldwin-Wallace College.
1 Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 101 S.W. 2d 977 (1937); Abernethy v. Burns,
206 N. C. 370, 173 S. E. 899 (1934); 63 U. S. Stat. 103 (1949); 28 U. S. C.
Sec. 1654 (1964).
2 1 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, ch. 2 (1958, with 1965 suppl.); Paradise
v. Nowlin, 86 Cal. App. 2d 897, 195 P.2d 867 (1948).
3 Black, Law Dictionary 899 (4th Ed. 1951).
4 68 Ill. App. 2d 234, 215 N. E. 2d 678 (1966). The court held that where a
corporation obtained judgment in small claims division of county circuit
court in a suit initiated and tried by the corporation's office manager, an
unlicensed attorney, judgment should be vacated and suit dismissed at cor-
poration's cost.
5 Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. 738 (1824); Mullin-Johnson Co. v.
Penn. Mut. Life Insurance Co., 9 F. Supp. 175 (N. D. Cal. 1934). See gen-
erally, 9 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, 323, Sec. 4463 (Rev. Ed. 1964).
6 Black, op. cit. supra n. 3, at 1364; meaning to appear for himself.
7 Biggs v. Schwalge, 341 111. App. 268, 93 N. E. 2d 87 (1950); People ex rel.
Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77 N. E. 2d 693 (1948).
8 Paradise v. Nowlin, supra n. 2. See also Note, Appointment of Counsel
for a Defaulting Corporation in a Criminal Proceeding, 1960 Duke L. J. 649
(1960.)
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court.9 This leads to the conclusion that a natural person can
appear in propria persona while the same result is impossible
for a corporation because a corporation can act only through
agents. 10 The logical result then would be the following: if a
natural person chooses to represent himself in court, he may do
so; but should he decide to be represented by an agent, the agent
must be a duly licensed attorney admitted to the bar of that par-
ticular jurisdiction. Now as for the corporation: corporations
can only be represented and can only act through agents; a
corporation cannot represent itself, therefore it must appear in
court through the person of a duly qualified attorney. This does
follow logic, but what seems to be missing at this point is the
real, compelling answer to the question-Why? Why cannot a
corporation appear through the agency of one who is not an
attorney?
As early as 1868, in Nixon, Ellison and Co. v. S. W. Insurance
Co.," the court noted that even in Lord Coke's time it was the
recognized doctrine that a corporation aggregate could not appear
in person in an action. 12 A New York case 13 propounded the
theory that corporations cannot appear in their own person but
only through the agency of a duly licensed attorney because cor-
porations have always been subject to various limitations by
reason of their origin and because of numerous statutory controls
governing their activities. In Heiskell v. Mozie,' 4 the court ex-
pressed its sentiments in this manner:
While, therefore, the right to manage one's own cause per-
sonally is preserved and secured in all courts, federal and
state, the right has never been enlarged to include-by ap-
pointment or substitution-an agent. The question is whether
9 Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., 73 Colo. 586, 216 P. 718 (1923); New Jersey
Photo Engraving Co. v. Carl Schonert & Sons, 95 N. J. Eq. 12, 122 A. 307
(1923); Nispel v. Western Union R. R., 64 Il. 311 (1872); Kankakee Drain-
age Dist. v. Commissioners, 29 Ill. App. 86 (1887); Clark v. Austin, supra
n. 1; Black and White Operating Co. v. Grosbart, 107 N. J. L. 63, 151 A.
630 (1930); Culpeper Nat'l. Bank v. Tidewater Imp. Co., 119 Va. 73, 89 S. E.
118 (1916); Heiskell v. Mozie, 82 F. 2d 861 (D. C. 1936); MacNeil v. Hearst
Corp., 160 F. Supp. 157 (D. C. Del. 1958); Brandstein v. White Lamps, Inc.,
20 F. Supp. 369 (S. D. N. Y. 1937); Paradise v. Nowlin, supra n. 2.
10 Clark v. Austin, supra n. 1. The court held: a natural person may pre-
sent his own case in court or elsewhere, although he is not a licensed
lawyer. A corporation is not a natural person. It is an artificial entity cre-
ated by law. Being an artificial entity, it cannot appear or act in person.
It must act in all its affairs through agents or representatives. In legal
matters, it must act, if at all, through licensed attorneys.
11 47 Ill. 444 (1868).
12 Id. at 446.
13 Aberdeen Bindery v. Eastern States Printing & Publishing Co., 166 Misc.
904, 3 N. Y. S. 2d 419 (1938).
14 Supra n. 9, at 863.
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the person offering to conduct the litigation is the real party
in interest. To determine this, courts look through the
shadow to the substance.
Most cases that have ruled on this question lay emphasis on
the fact that corporations are artificial persons and that this fact
precludes a corporate appearance by anyone other than an at-
torney. It was pointed out in the New Jersey Photo Engraving
case 15 that by permissive statute a corporation could be an ex-
ecutor just as a natural person may be a lawyer, but not every
natural person may be a lawyer, so why should it be that cor-
porations merely because they are in existence may be per-
mitted to appear in propria persona? Consequently, a corpora-
tion can only act by means of a solicitor, as only members of
the bar have audience in the courts. 16
In MacNeil v. Hearst Corp. 7 the corporate plaintiff at-
tempted to prosecute a civil action by its corporate officers alone.
The federal court did not allow the action, following the rationale
that corporations can act only through agents and that such
agents must be attorneys at law. In dismissing the action the
court introduced a new approach. It mentioned the necessity of
a court having control8 over those representing a corporation
in court. If non-lawyer agents were allowed to represent their
corporations, what control would the court have over them?
These agents could appear freely and without any qualifications
as to character and background. 19 That this activity would
result in the "unauthorized practice of law" was brought out in
a South Carolina case.20 The court stated that a corporation
cannot appear in propria persona because courts cannot permit
a representative or employee of a corporation to engage in the
unauthorized practice of law based on the theory that the cor-
poration is thus acting for itself. The corporation in this instance
is presupposing itself to have the rights of a natural person.
The subject is treated in a succinct manner by most au-
thorities. One simply declares that a party to an action may ap-
pear in his own person or by attorney, unless the person is a
corporation, in such case it may appear in court only by at-
torney. 21 Another touches on the aspect of an individual pre-
15 New Jersey Photo Engraving Co. v. Carl Schonert & Sons, supra n. 9.
16 Ibid.
17 160 F. Supp. 157 (D. C. Del. 1958).
18 Ibid.
19 See People ex rel. Andrews v. Hassakis, 6 Ill. 2d 463, 129 N. E. 2d 9
(1955). The license to practice law is a privilege granted only by the
Supreme Court and can only be delimited, restricted or taken away by
that court or by statutory enactment.
20 State ex rel. Daniel v. Wells, 191 S. C. 468, 5 S. E. 2d 181 (1939).
21 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys at Law, Sec. 6 (2d Ed. 1963).
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senting his own case in court and even preparing the neces-
sary legal instruments for his cause without committing unlaw-
ful practice of law, but, unless expressly allowed by statute, a
corporation that attempts the same through a lay officer or em-
ployee may find itself and the layman guilty of illegally prac-
ticing law.22 If this were the case, the proceedings in a suit by
such a person not entitled to practice are a nullity and the
action may be dismissed. 23 If a judgment has been rendered, it
is void and will be reversed.24 In Connecticut, a statute 25'
specifies that since a corporation cannot practice law directly, it
cannot do so indirectly through its officers. A 1957 Connecticut
case, State Bar Association of Conn. v. Conn. Bank and Trust
Co.26 recognized the importance of restricting the practice of
law to natural persons licensed on the basis of character and
competence so as to protect the public from persons with a lack
of knowledge, skill, and integrity.
Where a corporate defendant already in the midst of court
proceedings filed with the court its consent to the withdrawal
of its attorneys, the court denied the withdrawal even though
the defendant may have been willing to assume representation
on its own behalf. Being a corporation, it is without capacity to
either represent others or itself.27 In a famous criminal case, 28
where the court was applying Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, the common law doctrine was adhered to, whereby cor-
porations may not appear except by counsel, and further, that a
judgment of conviction of a corporation after a trial where it
had not appeared by counsel would be invalid.29
But the cases have not always held such a hard and fast
line. In the early case of McLaughlin v. Gilmore,30 it was de-
termined that laymen might appear as agents for a party in
Justice of the Peace courts. Forty-six years later an Illinois
court overruled the McLaughlin case, holding that such services
rendered for another could not be rendered in a court of record
22 157 A. L. R. 284 (1945).
23 7 C. J. S. 725 (1937); Bennie v. Triangle Ranch Co., supra n. 9; Mullin-
Johnson Co. v. Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra n. 5.
24 7 C. J. S. 725 (1937).
25 C. G. S. A. Secs. 51-88 (1949).
26 20 Conn. Supp. 248, 131 A. 2d 646 (1957). Contra, American Sand &
Gravel Inc. v. Clark & Fray Const. Co., 2 Conn. Cir. 284, 198 A. 2d 68
(1963).
27 Laskowitz v. Shellenberger, 107 F. Supp. 397 (S. D. Cal. 1952).
28 United States v. Crosby, 24 F. R. D. 15 (S. D. N. Y. 1959).
29 Ibid., citing Osborn v. U. S. Bank, supra n. 5; Brandstein v. White
Lamps, Inc., supra n. 9.
30 1 Ill. App. 563 (1878). See also Burgess v. Federated Credit Service,
Inc., 148 Col. 8, 365 P. 2d 264 (1961), holding that suits in courts which are
not courts of record need not be carried on by licensed attorneys. C. R. S.
'53, 79-5-17.
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without a license to practice law.8 1 A Utah decision noted that
some jurisdictions permit corporations to appear in small claims
courts without an attorney and allow representation by agent,
but concluded that such conduct was not compatible with Utah
authority.8 2  In a matter where a taxpayer, a natural person,
attempted to bring action on behalf of a municipal corporation,
the court did not deny that the person had an interest to pro-
tect, but resolved the issue by saying the cause of action remains
in the corporation and that final relief is for its benefit. While
a layman may represent himself in court, he cannot even on a
single occasion represent another taxpayer.33
As long ago as 1913, in a law review article entitled Passing
of the Legal Profession,34 the author was moved to remark that
corporations are performing far too many paralegal duties for-
merly handled by attorneys, and that "the lawyer, as such, is
being devoured by his own Frankenstein." 35
Duties such as title searching, agency duties, etc. are excep-
tions to the prohibition of corporate professional practice.36
Earlier in this review the question was asked-Why can't a cor-
poration appear through the agency of one who is not an at-
torney? It seems to this writer that overpowering answers to
this question have not yet been forthcoming. Most of the cases
set forth the theory that natural persons may appear in propria
persona, while corporations, not being natural persons, simply
cannot make such an appearance. This reasoning is quite clear,
but it leaves rather vague the answer to why an agent of the
corporation cannot appear in its stead. A forceful reply, one
that best answers the question and should stand out as a final
solution to the problem, is found in a note in the Brooklyn Law
Review:
To allow the corporation to appear by an agent and say that
it is appearing in person would give it an uncalled-for ad-
vantage over the individual. . . . Not only would a change
in policy create an advantage in favor of the corporation,
but it would be a change fraught with dangers.. .. But the
31 People v. Hubbard, 313 Ill. 346, 145 N. E. 93 (1924).
32 Tuttle v. Hi-Land Dairyman's Ass'n., 10 Utah 2d 195, 350 P. 2d 616
(1960).
83 Niklaus v. Abel Construction Co., 164 Neb. 842, 83 N. W. 2d 904 (1957).
84 Bristol, Passing of the Legal Profession, 22 Yale L. J. 590 (1913).
35 Id. at 613.
86 1 Oleck, Modern Corporation Law, 114 (1958, with 1965 suppl.). Title
guarantee companies are generally exempted from the rules forbidding
corporate practice of law. But their functions are limited to searching and
guaranteeing titles, making loans or mortgages, and agency duties, and
otherwise they may not practice law. Citing Ohio Rev. Code, Secs. 1735.01-
1735.04; Land Title Abs. & Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N. E.
650 (1934).
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corporation with its many agents and extensive litigation
would, under a different rule as to personal appearance, be
allowed to conduct numerous law suits without the aid of
counsel. It might be to the advantage of the corporation to
hire people to conduct its litigation who would not be sub-
ject to disbarment. The extensive field of corporate litiga-
tion would be opened to anybody whether or not admitted
to the bar.3 7
Contra View
Contra opinion is scant; only a small number of reported
cases have advocated the appearance of corporations in propria
persona. The latest and most prominent of these are New York
cases and date back to the depression years. This is significant
because these courts perhaps were willing to relieve economically
depressed corporations of the financial burden of engaging at-
torneys. The Sellent-Repent Corp. v. Queens Borough Gas &
Elec. Co.3 s and A. Victor & Co. v. SleiningerH" cases support
the contra view but differ as to rationale. In the Sellent-Repent
case the court said that if a corporation does not go outside its
own corporate machinery in performing an act, it is acting in
person and upon equal footing with a natural person, including
the right to sue in person. The Victor case advanced two reasons:
(1) a corporation might be too impoverished to employ a lawyer
and (2) it might have a claim it believed to be just but could
find no lawyer who would accept the case, believing it to be
hopeless. A short time later, another New York decision 40 was
handed down allowing a corporation to appear without an at-
torney, citing the Victor case as a precedent. Today, with the
emerging prevalence of Legal Aid Societies and court-appointed
attorneys, this thinking would be quite unlikely.
Where authorized by the New York Civil Practice Act,4 1
in 10th St. & 5th Inc. v. Naughton,42 the court permitted the
signing and verification of the precept and petition by an agent
a7 Note, Appearance of Corporation Without Attorney, 7 Brooklyn L. Rev.,
371, 375 (1938).
38 160 Misc. 920, 290 N. Y. S. 887 (1936). The Sellent-Repent Case cited
La Farge v. Exchange Fire Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 352 (1860) which held: as a
corporation acts through the intervention of living agencies, in regard to
whom no rule of exclusion exists, it has all the advantage which can arise
from the opportunity of producing countervailing testimony, and the parties
meet upon terms of far greater equality than the old rule permitted.
39 255 App. Div. 673, 9 N. Y. S. 2d 323 (1939).
40 Milmoe v. Meyer, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 899 (1939).
41 N. Y. C. P. A. Sec. 1414 (6).
42 163 Misc. 437, 296 N. Y. S. 952 (1937). In Meyer v. Sarpy, 175 So. 2d 387
(La. App. 1965), the court permitted an agent of a corporation to appear
because a statute, Act 202 of 1932, did not require the intervention of an
attorney.
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of a corporate landlord in summary proceedings, but proceeded
to profess the common law concerning corporations appearing
only by attorney when instituting, prosecuting, or defending any
cause in the courts, thus half-heartedly endorsing the Sellent.
Repent case of the previous year. In Jardine Estates Inc. v.
Koppel, 43 the court was induced to allow a corporation to ap-
pear by agent, because the corporation and the agent were one
and the same.
A note in the Duke Law Journal44 stresses the point that no
good reason exists for not allowing corporation officers to appear
on its behalf. If the officer representing the corporation should
feel the need of legal assistance, the corporation would still be
at liberty to employ attorneys; and if the corporation is unable
to employ counsel, the court would be free to appoint counsel
just as in the case of an individual litigant.
Commenting favorably on the Victor case, a note in the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review 45 concludes that "office"
work of the lawyer is much more extensive than "court" work
and in the hands of unscrupulous people may be more prejudicial
to clients and the public than services rendered under the scru-
tiny of a judge; therefore prevention of a corporate appearance
by officer or agent doesn't eradicate any evil. Furthermore, since
the courts have the power to regulate those people using the
courts, it is submitted that disbarred attorneys acting as agents
or officers would quickly find themselves involved in contempt
proceedings.
Conclusion
The Sellent-Repent and Victor cases have attracted atten-
tion only because they are contrary to long established legal
thinking, not because they offer a new approach. Without a
new approach it seems improbable that corporations can ever
attain a status equal to that of a natural person in our courts.
And perhaps this is as it should be. A corporation is a creature
of the law, and not a human being.
43 24 N. J. 536, 133 A. 2d 1 (1957).
44 Note, Appointment of Counsel for a Defaulting Corporation in a Crim-
inal Proceeding, supra n. 8.
45 Note, Right of a Corporation to Bring Suit in its Corporate Name with-
out the Aid of an Attorney at Law, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1006 (1939).
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